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David Boonin’s Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm is a fantastic contri-
bution to the consistently bourgeoning, and increasingly important, philosophy of 
death literature. In this laser-focused book, Boonin aims to defend what he calls The 
Posthumous Wrongs Thesis, which is the claim that “It is possible for an act to make 
things worse for a person, or to make that person’s life go less well for them, in a 
way that generates a moral reason against doing it even if the act takes place after 
the person is dead” (p. 2). If true, this would obviously have important implications 
for our duties to the deceased. It would also help vindicate a view many non-philos-
ophers would regard as commonsensical, but which philosophers in the death litera-
ture agree is deeply puzzling (even if true) upon reflection.
Boonin begins the book by considering the case of the abstract expressionist art-
ist Clyfford Still, who worked most of his life to ensure that the art he was creating 
would be contained in one museum indefinitely or, failing that, locked away from 
public consumption forever. It was perhaps his strongest desire, one he maintained 
for his entire career as an artist, and one that was finally granted approximately thirty 
years after his death. Was this good for Stills to have this desire satisfied posthu-
mously? Would he have been harmed had his wishes been ignored and his roughly 
2,400 pieces of art were split up and sold throughout the world? Boonin argues that 
the answer to both questions is “Yes.” Furthermore, he argues that it is a short step 
from granting that the posthumous thwarting of desires can harm the deceased to 
allowing that it can wrong them.
With this last point in mind, Boonin spends the majority of the book defending 
what he calls The Posthumous Harm Thesis, which is the claim that “It is possible 
for an act to harm a person even if the act takes place after the person is dead” (p. 2). 
He defends that claim by way of the following Posthumous Harm Argument (PHA).
(1) It is possible for A’s act to inflict unfelt harm on B.
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(2) If it is possible for A’s act to inflict unfelt harm on B, then the Desire Satisfaction 
Principle is true.
(3) If the Desire Satisfaction Principle is true, then it is possible for A’s act to harm 
B even if the act takes place after B is dead.
  Therefore,
(4) It is possible for A’s act to harm B even if the act takes place after B is dead (pp. 
14-15).
Chapter Two: Unfelt Harm aims to defend the first premise of PHA by way of 
example. Boonin asks us to consider the case of Bob and Carol, who’ve agreed 
to be in a monogamous relationship, yet Carol secretly cheats on Bob without 
him ever becoming the wiser (or having his conscious experiences affected in any 
way) (§ 2.1). Boonin expects most readers to accept that Carol harms Bob with 
her actions, but for those who don’t share that judgment, he spends the remainder 
of the chapter trying to motivate this judgment and ward off objections. He moti-
vates the judgement by (1) appealing to the seemingly plausible axiom that “All 
else equal, it’s better for Bob’s life to go the way he wants it to go,” (2) comparing 
Bob’s life with another life (Rob’s) that is identical in every respect except that 
Rob isn’t cheated on, (3) offering a crib test, and, finally, (4) reviewing Nozick’s 
Experience Machine. He then turns to thoroughly responding to the most relevant 
objections.
Chapter Three: From Unfelt Harm to Frustrated Desire aims to defend the sec-
ond premise of PHA, at least in a modified form. Boonin does so first by way of 
considering alternative explanations for why Carol’s act really harms Bob (e.g. 
other attitudes besides desires are generating value, objective goodness inde-
pendent of desire determines value, Carol causes Bob to have false beliefs) and 
then rules out each explanation. The rest of the chapter considers and responds 
to objections to the second premise. The discussion here is rich and engaging and 
far too complex to adequately cover in a short review. Some of the most important 
objections concern what to say about merely instrumental desires, the problem of 
changing desires over time, and Parfit’s objections about purely other-regarding 
desires. With respect to the first of these objections, Boonin allows for a modified 
desire satisfactionism that only concerns intrinsic desires, though he also makes 
an interesting case for allowing that the satisfaction of mere instrumental desires 
also enhances well-being (pp. 72-73). In an illuminating discussion about the 
changing desires problem, Boonin draws an important distinction between desires 
conditional on their future persistence and those that aren’t (arguing that only sat-
isfying the latter can improve one’s life even after the person no longer has the 
desire) and between considerations of affecting someone’s lifetime well-being 
and their well-being going forward (arguing that temporal bias might justify 
favoring giving preference to well-being going forward). Finally, with respect to 
the Parfit-style concerns, Boonin develops the Relevant Desire Satisfaction Prin-
ciple, which holds that “if A’s act makes a proposition P false, B wants P to be 
true, and P is relevant to B’s life, then A’s act harms B” and proceeds to fill in the 
details, insofar as is possible, about what it means to be “relevant to B’s life” (p. 
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102). Boonin’s careful articulation of, and analysis of each objection, as well as 
his defense of an amended desire satisfactionism in response to them makes the 
book worth reading for anyone interested in the well-being (and not just death) 
literature.
Chapter Four: From Frustrated Desire to Posthumous Harm aims to defend the 
third premise of PHA and, more broadly, the idea that people can be posthumously 
harmed. Like the previous chapter, much of the argument is negative. Boonin starts 
with the positive case, the crux of which is simply that “people can have desires 
about how things go after they’re dead” and “since these desires are desires about 
how things go after they die, they are desires that can be frustrated by acts that take 
place after they die” (p. 113). The substance of chapter, however, lies in the negative 
arguments where Boonin carefully and charitably lays out each of the most impor-
tant objections to the existence of posthumous harms and responds to each in detail. 
This is where real philosophical progress is made.
Perhaps the most notable contributions are Boonin’s responses to the “No Subject 
Objection” (§ 4.2) and the “Backwards Causation Objection” (§ 4.3). The “No Sub-
ject Objection” holds that the relevant difference between the Carol and Bob exam-
ple and alleged posthumous harm examples is that there is no one to be harmed after 
death. Bob exists when he is cheated on, but dead people don’t exist, and so it sup-
posedly makes no sense to say they’re harmed at a time they don’t exist. Boonin can-
vasses three possible responses, but ultimately defends the claim that posthumous 
thwarting of desires harms people while they were alive and had the desire in ques-
tion (pp. 120-121). This avoids the “No Subject Problem” because there is a “sub-
ject who accrues the harm” and the subject exists at the time they accrue the harm.
However, this response invites the “Backwards Causation Objection,” which 
holds that it’s impossible to performs actions that cause things to happen in the 
past. While rejecting the standard Feinberg/Pitcher account, Boonin draws a distinc-
tion between some action causing something to happen and it making it the case 
that something is true. Just as future actions can make present beliefs false, so too 
can future actions frustrate presently held desires. One may object to this response, 
arguing that desire frustrations must still be “constrained by the kinds of laws that 
govern cases that involve physical causation” (p. 127). In response, Boonin offers 
a companions-in-guilt argument, noting that Carol’s actions supposedly harm Bob 
the instant he cheats on him even though “instantaneous physical causation across a 
large distance is just as impossible as backward physical causation” (p. 127). To me, 
this sounds like a potentially good argument against desire satisfactionism, rather 
than a good argument for a type of desire satisfactionism that also allows for posthu-
mous harm. But the companions-in-guilt move seems impeccable. Boonin proceeds 
to demonstrate that his argument goes through on any combination of views con-
cerning when propositions are true (tensed/tenseless) and the nature of time (future 
realism/non-realism). This is but one notable contribution of the book.
Chapter Five: From Posthumous Harms to Posthumous Wrongs aims to move from 
the truth of the Posthumous Harm Thesis to the truth of the Posthumous Wrongs Thesis. 
Boonin starts the chapter by considering and rebutting previously unconsidered objec-
tions to the Posthumous Harm Thesis (e.g. the Posthumous Benefits Objection) before 
moving on to objections against accepting the Posthumous Wrongs Thesis on the basis 
of the Posthumous Harm Thesis. He then transitions into discussing the implications of 
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the Posthumous Wrongs Thesis (with respect to, e.g., harvesting organs, posthumous 
publication, treatment of corpses), both because this is important in its own right and 
to ward off potential reductio arguments against his view. Naturally, Boonin shows that 
his view can both help guide action in these difficult to navigate moral cases, while 
avoiding generating clearly absurd verdicts.
As with the previous chapters, this chapter is filled with fascinating theoretical 
insights concerning issues that extend far into other debates. For instance, Boonin offers 
a principled heuristic, rooted in desire satisfactionism, to guide trade-offs between felt 
and unfelt harms (p. 177). Some of the greatest contributions of the book may be found 
in the, somewhat peripheral, theoretical arguments in each chapter. As another exam-
ple, going back to chapter two, Boonin demonstrates that the recent x-phi experiments 
that purport to cast doubt on the reliability of standard Experience Machine judgments 
in fact fail to do so. In a nutshell, since the survey questions stipulated that one’s mem-
ory would be wiped upon leaving the Experience Machine, they stack the deck in favor 
of staying (p. 33). Identifying this fatal methodological flaw in those studies matters for 
the well-being literature in general, not just the death literature.
Important theoretical work is accomplished in every chapter and real philosophical 
progress is made on issues that are central to a range of different debates. This book 
should then be of great interest to anyone interested in the ethics and well-being litera-
tures in addition to the target audience of philosophers who work on death. On the flip-
side, the central argument of the text is likely to be dialectically effective against a nar-
row group of philosophers. Unless one starts out with the intuitive judgments Boonin 
outlines at the beginning of the text, they will not be moved to accept the Posthumous 
Wrongs Thesis by the (typically clearly sound) arguments Boonin gives to show how 
this thesis can avoid the worst problems attributed to it. The central argument is, at the 
end of the day, an argument primarily for existing desire satisfactionists or those with 
pre-theoretical judgments in line with desire satisfactionism.
To be sure, Boonin does nearly everything possible, within the length of the book, 
to motivate each premise of the argument and to ward off objections. Yet, it is just a 
feature of the world that people have different starting points. Boonin’s crystal-clear 
argument (and arguments in defense of his argument and arguments against objections) 
go about as far as is possible in defending a kind of desire satisfactionism that allows 
for posthumous harm with one set of reasonable starting points. This set of arguments, 
however, simply cannot be dialectically effective against philosophers with a different 
set of reasonable starting points. This is, of course, a shortcoming of humans doing phi-
losophy, not a shortcoming of the book. It is actually virtue of the book that Boonin’s 
arguments bring us to, or at least very close to, philosophical bedrock.
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